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By assuming that the probability of 
default increases with the debt- 
service burden, it is shown that the 
set of adm issible rescheduling 
schemes of a sovereign debt to a 
private creditor can be depicted by a 
U -shaped curve in the plane 
spanned by the renegotiated annual 
d eb t rep a y m en t and the 
ren eg o tia ted  len gth  of th e  
repayment period. By classifying 
creditors and debtors by risk and 
time preference, the choice of a 
rescheduling scheme from this set 
and the likelihood of agreement is 
analysed for eighty-one possible 
com binations of creditors and 
debtors (JEL F34)
A preliminary draft of this paper was presented in the Eleventh Economic 
Theory Workshop hosted by The Flinders University of South Australia, 
Adelaide, February 1993.
I  INTRODUCTION
Unlike a private debt, a sovereign debt is not subject to the 
laws of bankruptcy or to the enforcement of collateral. Thus, 
when the potential penalties on default are not substantial, a 
rise in a country's level of indebtedness reduces that country's 
inclination to service its external liabilities. It is possible, 
however, that the probability of unilateral repudiation is 
moderated by a country's concern about the adverse effect of a 
default on its trustworthy reputation and, subsequently, on its 
access to foreign loans (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Kletzer, 
1984; Grossman and Van Huyck, 1988; and Levy, 1992) and by a 
threat of direct sanctions (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).
In view of the developing countries' high level of 
indebtedness, it has been argued by Krugman (1988) that a 
country's financial obligations act like a high marginal tax rate 
which deters governments from taking painful measures to 
improve a country's economic performance and discourages 
capital formation. Thus, when an indebted country is on the 
downward sloping side of the 'debt relief Laffer curve', both 
debtor and creditor can benefit from a debt-reduction. Kenen 
(1990) and Sachs (1990) have asserted that the external debt's 
overhang is a primary cause for economic slow-down for 
many of the developing countries and have recommended the 
establishment of an international institution for organising 
debt relief and debt-rescheduling negotiations between private 
creditors and indebted countries. In contrast, Bulow and Rogoff 
(1990) have argued that the external debt problem is a 
symptom of poor economic management and growth, that the 
presence of official creditors in debt negotiations ossifies the 
bargaining position of private creditors, and that efficiency 
would be best served by having less official involvement.
As argued in Krugman (1989), the basic approach for solving 
the developing countries' debt problem is rescheduling and 
concerted lending. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to 
identify the set of sovereign-debt rescheduling schemes which 
are admissable for both creditor and debtor for negotiation; and 
second, to analyse the creditor's and debtor's risk and time 
preference over the feasible set and to assess the prospects for 
agreement. Assuming that a country's inclination to repay its 
liabilities decreases with its debt burden, but that the costs of 
repudiation are substantial, and recognising that short-term 
illiquidity does not necessarily lead to long-term insolvency, 
this paper analyses the set of debt-rescheduling schemes which 
are admissible for both the debtor and the creditor. It is shown 
that this set can be depicted by a U-shaped curve in the plane 
spanned by the renegotiated annual debt repayment and period 
of repayment. The location of the preferred rescheduling 
scheme on this curve is identified for eighty-one possible 
combinations of creditors and debtors classified by their 
attitude toward risk and rate of time preference.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II analyses 
the probability of default and the expected annual debt 
repayment and constructs the debt Laffer curve. Section III 
presents the debt repayment constraint and constructs the 
admissible rescheduling curve. Section IV describes the effects 
of risk and time preference on the creditor's and debtor's 
choices of an admissible rescheduling scheme. Section V 
presents the possible combinations of creditors and debtors and 
indicates the likelihood of agreement between them about a 
rescheduling scheme. The degree of similarity between the 
creditor's choice and the debtor's choice is discussed further in 
the concluding remarks in section VI.
IL PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT, EXPECTED ANNUAL DEBT
REPAYMENT AND THE DEBT LAFFER CURVE
Consider a situation in which a sovereign country is liable to a 
single private creditor, or to a well-coordinated syndicate of 
private creditors, and cannot service its external liabilities in 
accordance with the originally contracted terms, and in which 
both the indebted country and its creditor have a sufficient 
incentive for rescheduling the country's liabilities over a T- 
year period in equal (in constant prices) annual repayments of 
principal and interest. Dealing with a sovereign country whose 
asset holdings abroad are negligible, the creditor is aware of the 
fact that her control over the rescheduled repayment is 
limited. Nevertheless, assume that the probability of default 
perceived by the creditor is smaller than one due to substantial 
costs that can be inflicted directly by retaliatory sanctions, such 
as a ban on trade and credit, and indirectly through a loss of 
trustworthy reputation. Assume further that the perceived 
probability of default: 1. rises with the burden of servicing the 
debt, measured by the ratio of the renegotiated  annual 
repayment to the indebted country's level of gross national 
product (GNP), as public pressure against tax-increase and 
subsidy-cuts mounts; and 2. decreases with the creditor's ability 
to retaliate by limiting the country's access to the international 
credit market proportionately to the creditor's market share.
These assumptions are incorporated into the following 
linear expression:
p = a(M /Y) - As (1)
where
p = the probability of default,
M =  a constant renegotiated annual repayment of 
principal and interest in constant prices,
Y = the indebted country's GNP in constant prices, 
s = the creditor's share in the international credit 
market,
a  = a positive scalar indicating the marginal effect of the 
debt burden on the country's inclination to default,1 
and
A, = a positive scalar indicating the deterrent effect of the 
creditor's power in the international credit market.
In accordance with the debt-overhang hypothesis, assume 
that the indebted country's investment is adversely affected by 
the annual debt repayments through a decline in the 
government budget for investment and through an (expected 
and actual) increase in tax rates, which, in the presence of 
capital mobility, discourages capital formation and repatriation 
of flight capital (Krugman, 1989; Helpman, 1989; Dooley and 
Helpman, 1992; and Boyce, 1992).2 Since the country's GNP is 
directly related to investment, this assumption implies that 
the indebted country's GNP is adversely affected by the annual 
debt repayment as indicated, for convenience, by the following 
linear equation:
Y = Y -5 M , 8>1 (2)
1 Following Berg and Sachs (1988), it can be argued that a is affected 
by the indebted country's social, political and economic structure.
2 For tests of the debt-overhang hypothesis see Levy, Chowdhury 
and Wilson (1991), Cohen (1993) and Levy and Chowdhury (1993).
where Y is the highest level of GNP attainable had the annual 
debt-repayments been nil, and 8 is a positive scalar indicating 
the potentially adverse marginal effect of the renegotiated 
annual debt-repayment on the country's GNP. Equation 2 also 
indicates that the renegotiated debt-repayment cannot exceed
Y /d
The substitution of equation 2 into equation 1 for Y implies 
that the probability of default perceived by the creditor is given 
by
p = a[M /  (Y-8M)] - Xs (3)
which, by differentiation, indicates that
_ ocY 
PM ~ (Y -  8M)2
>  0 (4)
and
28aY
Pmm “  -  _ ,  > 0. 
(Y - 5M)3
(5)
Obviously, the creditor requires that 0 < p < 1. Since p rises 
with M, this requirement implies that the renegotiated annual 
debt repayment lies within the interval M min < M <  Mmax, 
where p(Mnun) = 0 and p(Mmax) = 1- The substitution of these 
boundary conditions into equation 3 yields:
(6)
and
J  J______
l^a + 8(1+Xs) J
Note that since a  > 0, M max < Y/ 8. Note further that the feasible 
interval Mmax - Mmin is rightwardly shifted by larger values of
Y and Xs and by smaller values of a  and 8. This interval is also
enlarged by higher values ofY.
In view of the above arguments, the annual debt-repayment 
(ADR) is perceived by the creditor to be distributed as follows:
f M l-aM/<y-8M) + Xs 
ADR = 1 _ (8)
[ 0  <xM/(Y-8M)-Xs.3
Consequently, the expected annual debt repayment (EADR) is:
EADR = [1 - cxM/(Y - 8M) + As]M (9)
and by differentiation
= 1 '  + Pm M̂^  |  0 as M = M (10)
3 The nature of the analysis will not be substantially changed by 
replacing the assumption of a complete default by a partial 
default, i.e., an actual annual repayment of gM dollars (0 < g < 1) 
with probability p.
where
M
- W
a
a +5(l+A s).
Y
(11)
Intuitively, an increase in the renegotiated annual debt 
repayment reduces the probability of payment each year and, 
hence, the expected annual debt repayment is subject to a ' debt
Laffer curve'. That is, beyond the critical level M an increase in 
the payment due causes the probability of default to go up so 
much that expected payment falls. Thus, EADR rises and then 
falls with M as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 The debt Laffer curve
ffl. DEBT REPAYMENT CONSTRAINT AND THE 
ADMISSIBLE RESCHEDULING CURVE
Suppose that the distribution of the actual annual debt- 
repayment is perceived by the creditor to be stable over the 
repayment period.4 In view of equation 9, the present value 
(PV) of the stream of the expected annual debt-repayments 
(SEADR) over a T-year period is given by:
T
PV(SEADR) = S  [l-aM /(Y-8M )+te]M /(l+r)‘ 
t=0
=  [l-cxM/(y-8M)+Xs]M[p(l-pT)/(i-p)] (12)
where
p = 1/(1+r) (13)
and r is a constant, real, interest rate per annum.
Suppose that equation 3 and the values of its right-hand- 
side variables and coefficients are common know ledge  in the 
sense that the debtor knows that the creditor uses equation 3 
and relevant data and that the creditor knows that she (the 
debtor) uses the same equation and data in assessing the 
probability of default, and vice versa, and that the creditor is 
aware of the possibility that, due to a domestic pressure, the 
sovereign might not always be able to raise taxes and reduce 
other spending (e.g., subsidies) for servicing the country's
4 Alternatively, one may incorporate, for example, an anticipation 
of economic growth, or economic slowdown, into the analysis by
multiplying (Y - dM) by a shift factor gt, where g is a positive 
scalar equal to one plus the anticipated growth rate.
external liabilities. Suppose further that the creditor's profits 
from retaliation are small and that the creditor believes that 
the sovereign is reliable in the sense that a short-term, or 
current, illiquidity does not necessarily lead to a long-term 
insolvency. In which case, the creditor prefers to tolerate the 
uncertainty about future repayments and negotiates new debt- 
repayment's terms which implicitly incorporate episodes of 
temporary illiquidity. In this setting, and in view of equation 
12, it is suggested that the rescheduling schemes (M,T) which 
are admissible for negotiation by both the creditor and debtor 
should obey the following debt-repayment constraint:
[1 - aM/(?-8M)+Xs]M[p(l-pT)/(l-p)] = D0 (14)
where Do denotes the country's external debt, after discount, at 
the beginning of the planning horizon. This constraint can be 
equivalently rendered as
T = {log{p-(l-p)Do/[l-cxM/(y-5M)+Xs]M}/log|3} -1 . (15)
The set of all the admissible rescheduling schemes can be 
depicted by a curve in the M-T plane, which is referred to 
hereafter as the adm issible rescheduling curve. By totally 
differentiating equation 14 and by recalling that the probability 
of default rises with M, it can be shown that along the 
admissible rescheduling curve of a sovereign debt the period of 
repayment is initially shortened but later lengthened as the 
renegotiated annual repayment rises.
PROPOSITION: Along the admissible rescheduling curve
dM
< 0 for Mmin < M< M
= 0 for M=M (!6 )
> 0 for M <M<M max.
The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix. 
Intuitively, note that 1-(3T rises as T rises. Hence, EADR must 
fall as T rises to satisfy the debt repayment constraint 14. This 
requires M initially to fall and then to rise as T rises. If M is 
small, the Laffer curve is upward sloping. Thus, for small 
values of M, a higher M means a higher EADR and 
subsequently shorter period of repaying Do- At some point, 
however, EADR begins to fall as M continues to rise. At this 
point, T must be raised to maintain Do constant as M rises.
Figure 2 illustrates the above-mentioned proposition by 
displaying the set of all the rescheduling schemes which are 
admissible for negotiation by both the debtor and the creditor,
Q = {(M,T)e $(.+: [l-aM/(Y-5M)+As]M[p(l-pT)/(i.p)]=Do}/ as a
U-shaped curve in the plane spanned by M and T.5 Equation 14 
indicates further that an increase in the debtor's initial 
liabilities and an increase in the international interest rate shift
5 If the assumption of common knowledge is replaced by asymetric 
information, it is likely that the debtor would claim that the 
probability of default is lower than that perceived by the 
creditor, for any given annual debt repayment, in order to obtain a 
repayment period shorter than that required by the creditor. In 
which case, the admissible rescheduling curve considered by the 
debtor lies below the rescheduling curve considered by the creditor.
the adm issible rescheduling curve upward, whereas an 
increase in the country's potential GNP level and an increase 
in the creditor's market share in the international credit 
market shift the curve downward by reducing the probability 
of default.
Figure 2. The admissible rescheduling curve
IV. RISK, TIME PREFERENCE AND THE CREDITOR'S AND 
DEBTOR'S CHOICES
The admissible rescheduling curve developed above is the 
locus of all combinations of M and T yielding a constant sum 
of discounted expected annual repayments which is equal to 
the remaining external debt after an initial and predetermined 
discount. Attitude toward risk and time preference, which may
affect the creditor's and debtor's choice of a rescheduling 
scheme, are not included in the construction of this curve. 
These factors are considered now to identify the preferred 
admissible rescheduling schemes by the creditor and the 
debtor.
From the creditor's perspective there is a trade-off between 
risk of nonpayment and impatience along the downward- 
sloping side of the rescheduling curve. That is, the costs of a 
shorter period of debt repayment is the increase in the level of 
risk bearing as the recontracted annual payment rises. If the 
creditor's decision was not affected by time preference, a risk- 
averse creditor would prefer rescheduling scheme A over any 
other scheme, regardless of her intensity of risk aversion, in 
order to minimise the variance of the total repayment for the 
given amount of expected total repayment. However, 
impatience shifts the creditor's choice downward along the 
admissible rescheduling curve toward C. Schemes along the 
upward-sloping side of the curve may be considered by the 
creditor if she is either risk neutral or risk lover. In general, the 
creditor's choice of an admissible rescheduling scheme is 
indicated by one of the nine possible cells defined by attitude 
toward risk and time preference and displayed by Table 1. The 
schemes chosen by the nine types of creditors are indicated on 
the admissible rescheduling curve in Figure 2 by A, B, C, D, E, F 
and G .
Table 1 The creditor's choice of an admissible rescheduling 
scheme
Attitude toward risk o f  nonpayment
Aversion Neutrality Love
Strong
(Impatience) C D E
Average B D F
Weak
(Patience)
A A or G G
5!
Ita,
.5
f-.
Similarly, from the debtor's point of view there is a trade-off 
between risking current domestic stability and altruism toward 
future generations along the downward-sloping side of the 
admissible rescheduling curve. That is, the costs of alleviating 
the current burden of the external debt by negotiating a small 
annual repayment and avoiding painful measures that might 
lead to social and political instability is the foregone 
consumption of future generations imposed by spreading the 
debt repayment over a long period. Schemes along the 
upward-sloping side of the curve may be considered by the 
indebted sovereign if she is either risk neutral or risk lover 
and ready to face the social unrest and the political risk 
stemming from a large annual repayment and believes that 
the high domestic pressure would lead to frequent and 
excusable nonpayment. In general, the choice of an admissible 
rescheduling scheme falls into one of the nine categories
defined by the sovereign's attitude toward risk and time 
preference as displayed in Table 2. For sim plicity, the 
rescheduling schemes chosen by the nine types of debtors are 
also illustrated by A, B, C, D, E, F and G on the admissible 
rescheduling curve in Figure 2. More generally, the chosen 
schemes are rather likely to be in the vicinity of these points.
Table 2 The debtor's choice of an admissible rescheduling 
scheme
Attitude toward risking domestic stability
Aversion Neutrality Love
Strong
(myopia) A A orG G
Average B C F
Weak
(Altruism)
C D E
V. CREDITOR-DEBTOR COMBINATIONS OF AGREEMENT 
AND DISAGREEMENT
The possible combinations of creditors and debtors, their 
choices and the degree of similarity or difference between their 
choices are summarised by Table 3. In each cell of this table, the 
upper entry indicates the creditor's choice and the lower the
debtor's choice. The degree of similarity between these choices 
is indicated by = in the case of consensus, = in the case of a 
strong similarity, ~ in the case of a weak similarity, *  in the 
case of a substantial difference, and # in the case of a large 
difference. The combinations of creditor and debtor yielding 
consensus or similarity are further highlighted by shading. 
These combinations are located in the top-left, bottom-right, 
centre and centre-left regions of the table in which there is, in 
most cases, a similarity between the creditor's and debtor's 
attitude toward risk. In contrast, strong disagreement exists 
when one of the sides is risk averse while the other is risk 
lover as their choices lie on opposite sides of the admissible 
rescheduling curve and the debt Laffer curve.
Table 3 Combinations of types of creditors and debtors and 
their choices
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VL CONCLUSION
This paper proposed that the set of admissible rescheduling 
schemes of a sovereign debt can be depicted by a U-shaped 
curve in the plane spanned by the renegotiated annual debt 
repayment and the renegotiated repayment period. The 
classification of creditors and debtors by risk and time 
preference led to eighty-one distinct combinations. Consensus 
and good prospects for quickly reaching an agreement may be 
obtained in the following cases:
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk averse and if the creditor is 
patient whereas the debtor is myopic, they would both prefer the 
rescheduling scheme A with the smallest annual repayment and 
the longest period of repayment.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk averse and if the creditor is 
impatient whereas the debtor is altruist, they would both prefer 
the rescheduling scheme C.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk averse and having average 
rate of time preference, they would both prefer rescheduling 
scheme B with a relatively small annual repayment over a long 
period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk averse and if the creditor 
has an average rate of time preference and the debtor is altruist, 
they are likely to reach an agreement about a rescheduling scheme 
between B and C with a relatively small annual repayment over a 
considerably long period.
• If the debtor is risk averse and altruist and the creditor is risk 
neutral and not very patient, or if the creditor is risk averse and 
impatient and the debtor is risk neutral and altruist, they are 
likely to reach an agreement about a rescheduling scheme between 
C and D with a substantial annual repayment over a short period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk neutral and if the creditor is 
not patient and the debtor is altruist, they would both prefer 
scheme D with the shortest period of debt repayment and a 
substantial annual repayment.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and if the creditor is 
patient whereas the debtor is myopic, they would both prefer 
scheme G with the largest annual repayment and a considerably 
long repayment period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and if the creditor is 
impatient whereas the debtor is altruist, they would both prefer 
scheme E with a substantial annual repayment over a relatively 
short period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and have an average 
rate of time preference, they would both prefer scheme F with a 
very large annual repayment over a substantially long period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and the creditor is 
patient (or has an average rate of time preference) whereas the 
debtor has an average rate of time preference (or is myopic), they 
are likely to reach an agreement on a scheme between F and G with 
a high annual payment over a long period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and the creditor is 
impatient (or has an average rate of time preference) whereas the 
debtor has an average rate of time preference (or is altruist), they 
are likely to reach an agreement on a scheme between E and F with 
a large annual payment over medium length period of repayment.
• If the creditor is risk neutral and not very patient and the debtor is 
risk lover and altruist, they are likely to reach an agreement on a 
scheme with a short repayment period and a substantially large 
annual repayment between D and E. Such a rescheduling scheme is 
also likely to be chosen if the debtor is risk neutral and altruist and 
the creditor is risk lover and impatient.
• If the debtor is risk neutral and altruist and the creditor is risk 
averse and impatient, they are likely to reach an agreement on a 
scheme with a short repayment period and a substantial annual 
repayment between C and D.
Finally, when it is unclear which of the extreme schemes A 
and G is preferred by either the creditor, debtor, or both, there 
is a scope for consensus, but there is also a possibility of strong 
disagreement. The rest of the combinations reveal a high 
degree of disagreement about an admissible rescheduling 
scheme. In such cases, a substantial level of mediation is 
required.
APPENDIX
Proof of the U-Shaped Admissible Rescheduling Curve's 
Proposition
Equation 14 can be rewritten as
EADR(M)B(T) = D 0 
where EADR(M) is explicitly given by equation 9 and
BCD = p(l-pT)/(l-p).
By totally differentiating equation A.l
dT - 9EADR/3M
dM I Do = const. ” 3B/9T ‘
Since 9B/3T >  0,
. fdT ] f3EADR(M)l
Slgn {dM I D0 = const. J "  '  Slgn { 9M j
and in recalling equation 10,
dT
dM I Do = const.
<  0 for Mmin M < M 
=  0 for M=M
> 0 for M<M<Mmax l
(A.l)
(A.2)
(A.3)
(A.4)
(A.5)
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